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The Exclusionary Rule Revisited:
Good Faith in Fourth Amendment
Search and Seizure
I'm not a lawyer .... That's why I can see what the law
is like. It's like a single bed blanket on a double bed and three
folks in the bed and a cold night. There ain't ever enough
blanket to cover the case, no matter how much pulling and
hauling, and somebody is always going to nigh catch pneu-
monia .... The best you can do is do something and then
make up some law to fit and by the time that law gets on the
books you would have done something different.1
INTRODUCTION
Since its promulgation in Weeks v. United States,2 lawyers,
judges and legal szholars have grappled with the exclusionary
rule, finding that this "single bed blanket" fails to cover the my-
riad of circumstances in which fourth amendment issues arise.'
1 ROBERT PENN WARREN, ALL THE KING'S MEN 136 (Bantam ed. 1980).
2 232 U.S. 383 (1914). Weeks established the general rule, applicable to federal offi-
cers and agents, that evidence seized in violation of an individual's fourth amendment
rights is inadmissible in a federal criminal prosecution. The rule had its inchoate origin in
Boyd v. United States, 116 U.S. 616 (1886). The United States Supreme Court initially de-
clined to apply the exclusionary rule to the states in Wolf v. Colorado, 338 U.S. 25 (1949).
However, alarmed by abuses of the fourth amendment, the Court reversed itself in Mapp
v. Ohio, 367 U.S. 643 (1961), and required states to exclude illegally obtained evidence.
3 Justice Powell, in his concurring opinion in Robbins v. California, 453 U.S. 420
(1981), voiced his sentiments about the operation of the exclusionary rule as follows:
[T]he law of search and seizure with respect to automobiles is intolerably
confusing. The Court apparently cannot agree even on what it has held pre-
viously, let alone on how these cases should be decided. Much of this diffi-
culty comes from the necessity of applying the general command of the
Fourth Amendment to ever-varying facts; more may stem from the often
unpalatable consequences of the exclusionary rule, which spur the Court to
reduce its analysis to simple mechanical rules so that the constable has a
fighting chance not to blunder.
Id. at 430.
Justice Powell's statement about the confusion generated by the exclusionary rule
is ironic in light of the subsequent history of the holding in Robbins. A plurality in Robbins
held that a police officer cannot make a warrantless search of garbage bags found in the
trunk of an automobile. Less than a year later, the Court reversed itself by holding that
police officers do not have to obtain a warrant to search containers found in a vehicle as
long as they have legitimate grounds to stop the vehicle and probable cause to believe it
contains contraband. United States v. Ross, -- U.S. --, 102 S. Ct. 2157 (1982).
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There has been so much "pulling and hauling" at this blanket in
order to meet individual privacy interests4 protected by the
fourth amendment,5 and at the same time accommodate the
practical needs of the criminal justice system, that the rule's vi-
tality is seriously questioned.6
The United States Supreme Court has modified, limited and
carved exceptions to the rule on numerous occasions, 7 and attor-
4 Compare Robbins v. California, 453 U.S. at 430, (Powell, J., concurring) ("a cen-
tral purpose of the Fourth Amendment is to safeguard reasonable expectations of pri-
vacy") and Mapp v. Ohio, 367 U.S. at 655 (privacy is "implicit in the concept of ordered
liberty") with United States v. Ross, -- U.S. at --, 102 S. Ct. at 2171 ("an individual's ex-
pectation of privacy in a vehicle and its contents may not survive if probable cause is given
to believe that the vehicle is transporting contraband") and United States v. Calandra, 414
U.S. 338, 347 (1974) ("[t]he purpose of the exclusionary rule is not to redress the injury to
the privacy of the search victim") and Linkletter v. Walker, 381 U.S. 618, 637 (1965) (ex-
clusion of evidence does not restore the victim's privacy).
In Wilkey, the Exclusionary Rule: Why Suppress Valid Evidence?, 62 JUDICATURE
215 (1978) it is suggested that the decreased emphasis on privacy in search and seizure
cases is an expression of doubts "as to just what right of privacy guilty individuals have."
Id. at 220.
5 U.S. CONST. amend. IV states in full:
The right of the people to be secure in their persons, houses, papers,
and effects, against unreasonable searches and seizures, shall not be vi-
olated, and no Warrants shall issue, but upon probable cause, supported by
Oath or affirmation, and particularly describing the place to be searched,
and the persons or things to be seized.
6 Numerous commentators have been critical of the exclusionary rule. See generally
S. SCHLESINGER, EXCLUSIONARY INJUSTICE: THE PROBLEM OF ILLEGALLY OBTAINED EvI-
DENCE (1977); Burger, Who Will Watch the Watchman?, 14 AM. U.L. REv. 1 (1964);
Burns, Mapp v. Ohio: An All-American Mistake, 19 DE PAUL L. REv. 80 (1969); Friendly,
The Bill of Rights as a Code of Criminal Procedure, 53 CALIF. L. REv. 929 (1965); Kap-
lan, The Limits of the Exclusionary Rule, 26 STAN. L. REv. 1027 (1974); Oaks, Studying
the Exclusionary Rule in Search and Seizure, 37 CHI. L. REv. 665 (1970); Wilkey, A Call
for Alternatives to the Exclusionary Rule: Let Congress and the Trial Courts Speak, 62 Ju-
DICATURE 351 (1979); Wilkey, supra note 4; Wingo, Growing Disallusionment with the
Exclusionary Rule, 25 Sw. L.J. 573 (1971); Wright, Must the Criminal Go Free if the Con-
stable Blunders?, 50 TEX. L. REv. 736 (1972); Comment, The Exclusionary Rule in Search
and Seizure: Examination and Prognosis, 20 U. KAN. L. REv. 768 (1972).
Articles more favorable to the rule include Canon, Is the Exclusionary Rule in
Failing Health? Some New Data and a Plea Against a Precipitous Conclusion, 62 Ky. L.J.
681 (1973-74); Kamisar, The Exclusionary Rule in Historical Perspective: The Struggle to
Make the Fourth Amendment More Than an "Empty Blessing", 62 JUDICATURE 337 (1979)
[hereinafter cited as Historical Perspective]; Kamisar, Is the Exclusionary Rule an "Illog-
ical" or "Unnatural" Interpretation of the Fourth Amendment?, 62 JUDICATURE 66 (1978)
[hereinafter cited as Interpretation].
7 See the text accompanying notes 33-50 infra for a discussion of United States Su-
preme Court decisions that have restricted the scope and application of the exclusionary
rule.
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neys and judges must be on their toes to stay current with these
developments. The Kentucky Court of Appeals in Richmond v.
Commonwealth8 recently followed the approach taken by other
jurisdictions9 by applying yet another exception-the "good
faith" doctrine. Under this doctrine, evidence will not be ex-
cluded when "discovered by officers in the course of actions
taken in good faith and in the reasonable, though mistaken, be-
lief that they were authorized' 0 to make the search.
Although the Kentucky Supreme Court affirmed the judg-
ment of the court of appeals, it did so on different grounds." Be-
cause this issue probably will be raised again, this Comment will
examine the development of the good faith exception and its un-
derlying rationale. The discussion will focus on recent United
States Supreme Court decisions that limit and modify the exclu-
sionary rule. These decisions reveal that the Court does not con-
sider the rule to be coextensive with fourth amendment rights.
Next, this Comment analyzes state and lower federal court deci-
sions that have considered the good faith doctrine, concluding
that it is a theoretically sound doctrine that can balance the prac-
tical difficulties of police officers in the course of making a search
and seizure against the right of citizens to be free from fourth
amendment violations. The author nonetheless cautions that the
application of the good faith doctrine must be made with its pri-
mary purpose in mind: evidence may be admitted only when po-
lice officers could not have been deterred from making a fourth
amendment violation because they were acting reasonably and in
good faith.
I. DEVELOPMENT OF THE GOOD FAITH DOCTRINE
A. Justiications for the Exclusionary Rule
8 28 Ky. L. Summ. 10, at 17 (Ky. Ct. App. Aug. 12, 1981) [hereinafter cited as
KLS], aJj d, 29 KLS 10, at 17 (Ky. Aug. 31,1982).
9 The Kentucky Court of Appeals relied primarily upon United States v. Williams,
622 F.2d 830 (5th Cir. 1980), cert. denied, 449 U.S. 1127 (1981) and Peoplev. Adams, 439
N.Y.S.2d 877 (1981). For a discussion of these cases, see the text accompanying notes 51-60
infra.
10 28 KLS10. at 18,
n See note 62 infra for a discussion of the grounds used by the Kentucky Supreme
Court.
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The justifications and rationales which have been forwarded
in support of the exclusionary rule have changed in degree and
emphasis over the years, thus playing a significant role in the de-
velopment of the good faith doctrine. In Mapp v. Ohio,12 the Su-
preme Court set forth an all-encompassing rule whereby "all evi-
dence obtained by searches and seizures in violation of the Con-
stitution is, by that same authority, inadmissible in a state
court."' 3 Noting that the states had been unable to secure fourth
amendment rights by alternative means, 4 the Court concluded
12 367 U.S: 643(1961).
13 Id. at 655. It is interesting to note that the Court makes this all-or-nothing state-
ment about the application of the rule immediately following a description of the flag-
rancy of the violation. The officers in Mapp forcibly entered the defendant's residence
without a warrant, "[riunning roughshod" over her. Id. at 645.
One commentator argues that the extreme nature of the violation in Mapp led the
Court to establish "a rule of law created not to fit the facts before the Court (a judicial
function), but rather to solve the many enforcement problems presented by the fourth
amendment (a legislative function)." Comment, Impending "Frontal Assault" on the Cit-
adel: The Supreme Court's Readiness To Modify the Strict Exclusionary Rule of the
Fourth Amendment to a Good Faith Styndard, 12 TuLsA L.J. 337,348-49 n.95 (1976).
14 367 U.S. at 651-53. A wealth of commentators have suggested alternatives to the
exclusionary rule.
For a look at civil remedies as alternatives, see, e.g., Davis, An Approach to Legal
Control of the Police, 52 TEX. L. REv. 703, 717-22 (1974); Foote, Tort Remediesfor Police
Violation of Individual Rights, 39 MINN. L. REv. 493 (1955); McGarr, The Exclusionary
Rule: An Ill-Conceived and Ineffective Remedy, 52 J. CRIM. L. CRIMINOLOGY & POLICE
ScI. 266, 268 (1961); Oaks, supra note 6, at 717-18; Plumb, Illegal Enforcement of the
Law, 24 CORNELL L.Q. 337, 387 (1939); Spiotto, The Search and Seizure Problem-Two
Approaches: The Canadian Tort Remedy and the U.S. Exclusionary Rule, 1 J. POLICE
Sm. & A). 36 (1973); Taft, Protecting the Public From Mapp v. Ohio Without Amending
the Constitution, 50 A.B.A. J. 815,817 (1964); Wingo, supra note 6, at 581.A review board also has been suggested. See, e.g., Burger, supra note 6, at 15;
Roche, A Viable Substitute for the Exclusionary Rule: A Civil Rights Appeals Board, 30
WASH. & LEE L. REv. 223 (1973); Wingosupra note 6, at 580-81.
One commentator has suggested the use of an ombudsman. See Davidow, Crim-
inal Procedure Ombudsman as a Substitutefor the Exclusionary Rule: A Proposal, 4 TEx.
TECH. L. REv. 317 (1973).
For a look at how other countries treat illegally obtained evidence, see, e.g.,
Clemens, The Exclusionary Rule Under Foreign Law: Germany, 52 J. ClM, L. CI-
INOLOGY & POLICE SC!. 277 (1961); Cohn, The Exclusionary Rule Under Foreign Law: Is-
rael, 62 J. CRiM. L. CRIMINOLOGY & POLICE ScI. 282 (1961); Kamisar, Are Comparisons
With Other Countries Meaningful?, 62 JuDICATURE 348 (1979); Oaks, supra note 6, at
702-03, 705-06; Wilkey, Do Other Countries Exclude Illegally-Seized Evidence?, 62 Juni.
cATuRE 216 (1978).
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that the exclusionary rule was "part and parcel" of the Constitu-
tional prohibition against unreasonable searches. 15
Shortly after Mapp, the Court abandoned the proposition
that the rule was constitutionally based and instead justified the
rule by perceiving it as serving twin goals16-the deterrence of il-
legal searches and seizures by removing the incentive to violate
fourth amendment rights, 17 and the protection of the "imperative
of judicial integrity."' 8 As the exclusionary rule continued to
evolve, the judicial integrity rationale lost its forcefulness in
fourth amendment analysis, coming to be viewed as merely "an
assimilation of the more specific rationales... [which] does not
in their absence provide an independent basis for excluding chal-
lenged evidence."' 9 While its vitality was said to have been "re-
stored" in United States v. Peltier,° the Court today regards the
exclusionary rule as a judicially created remedy,21 and through
the use of a balancing test, suppresses improperly obtained evi-
dence only when the deterrence purposes of the rule will be
served. 22
15 367 U.S. at 651. The issue as to whether the exclusionary rule is constitutionally
based frequently arises among commentators. A.brief but helpful discussion of this issue
can be found in Interpretation, supra note 6, in which the author argues that the rule is
mandated by the Constitution. Justice Brennan is one of the few current members of the
Court who believes that the exclusionary rule is coextensive with the fourth amendment.
See United States v. Peltier, 422 U.S. 531,550-62 (1975) (Brennan, J., dissenting). Further
discussion may be found in Schrock and Welsh, Up From Calandra: The Exclusionary
Rule as a Constitutional Requirement, 59 MINN. L. REv. 251 (1974); Sunderland, The Ex-
clusionary Rule: A Requirement of Constitutional Principle, 69 J. CRim. L. & CIMINOL-
ocy 141 (1978); Yarbrough, The Flexible Exclusionary Rule and the Crime Rate, 6 AM. J.
Ci. L. 1 (1978).
16 See Brown v. Illinois, 422 U.S. 590, 599 (1975); United States v. Peltier, 422 U.S.
at 535-38; Terry v. Ohio, 392 U.S. 1, 12-13 (1968); Wong Sun v. United States, 371 U.S.
471,486(1963).
17 See Stone v. Powell, 428 U.S. 465,482 (1976); United Statesv. Peltier, 422 U.S. at
536-39; United States v. Calandra, 414 U.S. at 347-48; Alderman v. United States, 394
U.S. 165 (1969); Terry v. Ohio, 392 U.S. at 29; Tehan v. United States, 382 U.S. 406,413
(1966); Linkletter v. Walker, 381 U.S. at 637.
18 Mapp v. Ohio, 367 U.S. at 660. See also Elkins v. United States, 364 U.S. 206,220
(1960).
19 Michigan v. Tucker, 417 U.S. 433,450 n. 25 (1974).
20 422 U.S. at 553 n.13 (Brennan, J., dissenting).
21 Stone v. Powell, 428 U.S. at 482; United States v. Calandra, 414 U.S. at 348.
2 Brown v. Texas, 443 U.S. 47, 50-51 (1979); Michigan v. DeFillippo, 443 U.S. 31,
38 n.3 (1979); Dunaway v. New York, 442 U.S. 200, 209-10 (1979); Pennsylvania v.
Mimms, 434 U.S. 106,109 (1977).
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B. Criticisms of the Exclusionary Rule
The exclusionary rule has been the subject of a flood of crit-
icism since its adoption in Weeks and its subsequent application
to the states in Mapp. 26 Those who argue that it is the only viable
method of deterring fourth amendment violations 4 are met with
complaints that the rule is ineffective and encourages police
perjury.26 Without empirical data to support its deterrence pur-
Although one commentator believes the rule fails as a direct deterrent of illegal
police conduct, he nonetheless asserts that it serves two vital functions: (1) It is a measure-
able consequence of a fourth amendment violation, and (2) it provides occasion for judi-
cial review of police conduct. Oaks, supra note 6, at 755-56. Thus, even though there is no
direct deterrence,
[b]y demonstrating that society will attach serious consequences to the viola-
tion of constitutional rights, the exclusionary rule invokes and magnifies the
moral and educative force of the law. Over the long term this may integrate
some fourth amendment ideals into the value system or norms of behavior of
law enforcement agencies.
Id. at 756.
2 See note 6 supra for a general list of commentaries criticizing the rule.
24 Mapp v. Ohio, 367 U.S. at 651-52 dealt with the difficulties states had in trying to
find alternative means to protect fourth amendment rights. The Court relied primarily
upon California's experience and its adoption of the exclusionary rule in People v. Cahan,
282 P.2d 905 (1955). Several commentators have suggested that the rule itself hampers ef-
fective development of alternatives. E.g., Oaks, supra note 6, at 753; Paulsen, The Exclu-
sionary Rule and Misconduct by the Police, 52 J. Caim. L. & POL. Sci. 255, 257 (1955).
Some Supreme Court Justices have argued that the rule is inflexible and prevents states
from dealing with fourth amendment problems according to their own unique circum-
stances. See Stone v. Powell, 428 U.S. at 500 (Burger, J., concurring); Mapp v. Ohio, 367
U.S. at 681 (Harlan, J., dissenting).
2 The Supreme Court has noted that the efficacy of the rule has been questioned by
commentators. E.g., Stone v. Powell, 428 U.S. at 492 n.32; Bivens v. Six Unknown
Named Federal Narcotics Agents, 403 U.S. 388,411-422 (Burger, C.J., dissenting) (1970);
United States v. Elkins, 364 U.S. at 218; Irvine v. California, 347 U.S. 128, 135 (1954).
But see Terry v. Ohio, 392 U.S. at 12.
Empirical studies have been inconclusive. See generally Barlow, Patterns of Ar-
rests for Misdemeanor Narcotics Possession: Manhattan Police Practices 1960-62, 4 CrIM.
L. BULL. 549 (1968); Canon, A Postscript on Empirical Studies and the Exclusionary Rule,
62 JuDicAmE 455 (1979); Canon, supra note 6; Nagel, Testing the Effects of Excluding
Illegally Seized Evidence, 1965 Wis. L. REv. 283; Oaks, supra note 6; Schlesinger, The
Exclusionary Rule: Have Proponents Proven That it is a Deterrent to Police?, 62 JUDICA-
TURE 404 (1979); Spiotto, An Empirical Study of the Exclusionary Rule and Its Alterna-
tives, 2 J. L3GAL STUD. 243 (1973); Comment, Effect of Mapp v. Ohio on Police Search-
and-Seizure Practices in Narcotics Cases, 4 COLUM. J.L. & Soc. PoaBS. 87 (1968).
26 United States v. Janis, 428 U.S. 433, 447-48 n.18 (1976). The consequences of the
exclusionary rule upon police perjury have also been discussed in Garbus, Police Perjury:
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poses, the rule is said to operate at a high cost to society.27 It is
contended that, instead of protecting judicial integrity, the rule
actually erodes public confidence in the fact-finding process
when used to exclude probative evidence.
2
Critics also argue that the rule operates only when police
have, in fact, found incriminating evidence, and does nothing to
deter police from making illegal searches purely for harassment
purposes.2 Some commentators suggest that the exclusionary
rule hampers gun control.-"Others complain of the rule's inflex-
ibility since it fails to take into account the seriousness of the
crime.3M Further, critics charge that the rule operates arbitrarily
by failing to recognize differences between flagrant and mild
abuses of fourth amendment rights.32
An Interview with Martin Garbus, 8 Cram. L. BULL. 363 (1972); Comment, Police Perjury
in Narcotics "Dropsy" Cases: A New Credibility Gap, 60 GEo. L.J. 507 (1971).
27 Wilkey, supra note 4, at 215. Judge Wilkey of the United States Court of Appeals
for the District of Columbia writes: "The questionable justification for such a rule is all the
more apparent when we realize that it represents, not a constitutional mandate, but a pol-
icy choice by our Supreme Court." Id.
2 Id. at 223. Judge Wilkey writes: "I submit that the exclusion of valid, probative,
undeniably truthful evidence undermines the reputation of and destroys the respect for the
entire judicial system." Id.
2 Wright, supra note 6, at 737.
30 Wilkey, How the Exclusionary Rule Hampers Gun Control, 62 JuDICATURE 224
(1978); Contra, Historical Perspective, supra note 6, at 342-43.
3 Kaplan, supra note 6, at 1046; Schlesinger, supra note 25, at 405; Wilkey, supra
note4, at 226.
32 In calling for an alternative to the exclusionary rule, Judge Wilkey wrote: "[I]t
should be an objective of any substitute for the exclusionary rule to introduce comparative
values into what is now a totally arbitrary process and inflexible penalty. Under the exclu-
sionary rule, the 'penalty' is the same irrespective of the offense." Wilkey, supra note 4, at
228.
The American Law Institutes MODEL CODE OF PRE-ARRAiGNMENT PRoCEDuRES S
SS 290.2 (Proposed Official Draft, 1975) would require a court to consider a number of
factors before determining whether illegally-seized evidence should be suppressed in fed-
eral criminal prosecutions. Earlier versions of this draft were introduced into the United
States Senate in 1971 and 1973. S. 2657, 92d Cong., 1st sess., 117 CONG. REc. 35,183
(1971); S. 881, 93d Cong., lst sess., 119 CONG. REC. 4195 & 10,973 (1973).
Senator Bentsen, the bill's sponsor, explained the operation of the proposal as fol-
lows:
In determining whether to admit or suppress certain evidence, the
court would consider such factors as the extent to which the violation was
willful, the extent to which it deviated from sanctioned conduct, and the ex-
tent to which it invaded the privacy of the defendant or prejudiced the de-
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C. Limits on the Operation of the Exclusionary Rule
Along with the commentators just discussed, the United
States Supreme Court has expressed discontent with the oper-
ation of the exclusionary rule and has restricted the scope of the
rule's operation in several contexts. The foundation for subse-
quent limitations can be found in United States v. Calandra,3 in
which the Court held the exclusionary rule inapplicable to grand
jury proceedings. In so holding, the Court emphasized that the
exclusionary rule is a judicially-created remedy rather than a
personal right of redress.34 It further reasoned that the "prime
purpose" of the rule is deterrence,," and "[a]ny incremental de-
terrent effect which might be achieved by extending the rule to
grand jury proceedings is uncertain at best." 36
A balancing of the deterrent effect of the rule against the
costs of excluding valid evidence also was done in Michigan v.
Tucker,37 a case involving a Miranda violation under the fifth
amendment.-" The questioning of the defendant in Tucker was
performed prior to the Court's decision in Miranda. Noting that
it was an unrealistic burden to expect a police officer to anti-
cipate the Miranda decision,,39 the Court observed that the exclu-
sionary rule assumes that "police have engaged in willful, or at
the very least negligent, conduct . ."40
fendant's ability to defend himself.
Other factors to be considered would be the extent to which suppres-
sion would deter such violations in the future and whether the evidence
seized would have been discovered despite the violation.
117 CONG. REC. 35,184 (1971).
33 414 U.S. 338 (1974).
34 Id. at 348.
3 Id. Accord, Linkletterv. Walker, 381 U.S. at637.
"a 414 U.S. at 351.
37 417 U.S. 433 (1974).
38 The relationship between the fourth and fifth amendments has been discussed in
several Supreme Court decisions, beginning with Boyd v. United States, 116 U.S. at 616.
Both amendments provide an "independent ground for suppression." Brown v. Illinois,
422 U.S. at 606 n.1 (Powell, J., concurring). For a further look at their relationship, see
Wong Sun v. United States, 371 U.S. at471; Mapp v. Ohio, 367 U.S. at 646 n.5.
39 417 U.S. at 446 ("The pressures of law enforcement and the vagaries of human na-
ture would make such an expectation unrealistic. Before we penalize police error, there-
fore, we must consider whether the sanction serves a valid and useful purpose.").
40 Id. at 447.
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A similar approach was used in United States v. Peltier,41 a
case involving the constitutionality of border searches conducted
without probable cause. The Court declined to apply the exclu-
sionary rule retroactively when the officer was acting in the good
faith belief that his conduct conformed with constitutional re-
quirements. Exclusion of the illegally-seized evidence would not
have deterred the police officer, the Court reasoned,4 and inclu-
sion of the evidence would not offend judicial integrity.
43
Proponents of the good faith doctrine find further support in
Justice Powell's concurring opinion in Brown v. Illinois.44 He
made a distinction between "flagrantly abusive" fourth amend-
ment violations and "technical violations,"' and observed that
"[b]etween these extremes lies a wide range of situations that de-
fy ready categorization." 46 According to Justice Powell, a careful
analysis would be required in each case to determine whether the
41 422 U.S. at 531.
42 Id. at 542. The Court stated:
If the purpose of the exclusionary rule is to deter unlawful police conduct
then evidence obtained from a search should be suppressed only if it can be
said that the law enforcement officer had knowledge, or may properly be
charged with knowledge, that the search was unconstitutional under the
Fourth Amendment.
Id.
The search involved in Peltier occurred four months prior to the Court's decision
in Almeida-Sanchez v. United States, 413 U.S. 266 (1973), in which the Court held a war-
rantless search conducted 70 miles from the Mexican border and without probable cause
to be unconstitutional.
43 422 U.S. at 537. The Court explained:
[I]f the law enforcement officers reasonably believed in good faith that evi-
dence they had seized was admissible at trial, the "imperative of judicial in-
tegrity" is not offended by the introduction into evidence of that material
even if decisions subsequent to the search or seizure have broadened the ex-
clusionary rule to encompass evidence seized in that manner.
Id.
44 422 U.S. at 590. The narrow holding of the majority dealt solely with whether Mi-
randa warnings in and of themselves would purge the taint of a confession made after an
Illegal arrest. The majority followed the "totality of the circumstances" approach set forth
in United States v. Wong Sun, 371 U.S. at 471. Under this test, the circumstances of the
case are evaluated to determine if the deterrence purposes of the rule will be met. The ma-
jority did not explicitly consider the good faith of the officers, but nonetheless stated that
the "purpose and flagrancy of the official misconduct" were relevant factors. 422 U.S. at
604.
45 Id. at 609-12.
46 Id. at 612.
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deterrence purposes of the exclusionary rule would be served47
The question in such an analysis would be whether the officers
reasonably believed their conduct was constitutional. 4s
In the more recent case of Rawlings v. Kentucky,49 Justice
Rehnquist, writing for the majority, stated that "Brown man-
dates consideration of the purpose and flagrancy of the official
misconduct" before a court can decide whether to exclude the
fruits of a search and seizure which violates the fourth amend-
ment. In sum, the Court has declined to view the exclusionary
rule as coextensive with the fourth amendment.
D. Adoption of the Good Faith Doctrine
As the foregoing analysis illustrates, the Court has limited the
application of the exclusionary rule in a number of contexts, but
has yet to explicitly adopt the good faith doctrine. 51 Nonetheless,
lower state and federal courts, anticipating that its adoption is
near, have attempted to delineate the good faith exception's
boundaries and to define its requirements. Reliance has been
placed primarily upon United States v. Williams,52 a 1980 en
47 Id.
48 Id. at 612-13.
49 448 U.S. 98 (1980).
50 Id. at 109. The Court ruled that "the conduct of the police here does not rise to the
level of conscious or flagrant misconduct requiring prophylactic exclusion of petitioner's
statements." Id. at 110.
51 At least four members of the Court, Justices Powell, Rehnquist, White and Chief
Justice Burger, have advocated the good faith doctrine. Ball, Good Faith and the Fourth
Amendment: The "Reasonable" Exception to the Exclusionary Rule, 69 J. CnIM. L. &
CRIMINOLOGY 635 (1978). It has been reported that recently-appointed Supreme Court
Justice Sandra Day O'Connor favors admission of relevant evidence obtained by police of-
ficers who, at the time of the search, were unaware that the search and seizure was uncon-
stitutional. Lexington Herald-Leader, Sept. 12,1981, at A4, col. 2.
However, in the recent 5-4 decision of Taylor v. Alabama, 50 U.S.L.W. 4783,
(June 23, 1982), the Court was asked to recognize a good faith exception to the exclusion-
ary rule but declined to do so. The Court's basis in reversing the conviction of a robbery
suspect was that the defendant's confession should have been suppressed as the fruit of an
illegal arrest. Writing for the majority, Justice Marshall based the decision upon Dunaway
v. New York, 442 U.S. at 200 and Brown v. Illinois, 422 U.S. at 590. Justice Marshall did
not analyze or evaluate the good faith exception, but merely stated: "To date, we have not
recognized such an exception, and we decline to do so here." Id. at 4785. The dissent,
written by Justice O'Connor and joined by Justices Powell and Rehnquist and Chief Jus-
tice Burger, did not discuss the good faith doctrine.
52 622 F.2d 830 (Sth Cir. 1980).
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banc decision of the Fifth Circuit Court of Appeals.
Jo Ann Williams was arrested in Georgia for violating a court
order requiring her to stay in Ohio. A small amount of heroin
was seized in a search incident to the arrest, and a larger quan-
tity was found in her luggage in a search performed after the ar-
resting officer obtained a search warrant. Williams claimed that
her arrest was illegal because only a court, and not a field officer,
can initiate contempt charges based upon a violation of a court
order. The court of appeals disagreed, holding that a police of-
ficer has the authority to make a warrantless arrest for the viola-
tion of a court order which occurs in his presence. 0
The court of appeals provided alternative grounds for its de-
cision. The court held that even if the arrest was illegal, the
heroin would not be suppressed because the police officer was
acting in the good faith belief that his conduct was constitution-
al.5 The good faith analysis in Williams is consistent with the
balancing approach taken by the United States Supreme Court in
other contexts; the court, in determining the propriety of exclud-
ing probative evidence which has been improperly obtained,
considers whether the deterrent effect on illegal police conduct as
the result of exclusion is sufficient to overcome the cost to society
of suppressing this evidence.-,
Noting that the Supreme Court "has restricted the applica-
tion of the rule so that it is not now-if it ever was-coextensive
with the fourth amendment,"-" the court stated that "[a]nalyt-
" Id. at 839. The defendant's motion to suppress was granted by the United States
District Court for the Northern District of Georgia. That decision was initially affirmed
by a three-judge panel of the court of appeals. United States v. Williams, 594 F.2d 86 (5th
Cir. 1979). The present case reversed the latter decision upon a rehearing en bane.
54 Id. at 840.
55 For a discussion of these cases, see the text accompanying notes 33-50 supra.
56 622 F.2d at 841. In support of this proposition, the court of appeals listed not only
Peltfer, Tucker and Calandra, but also Michigan v. DeFillippo, 443 U.S. at 31 (exclusion-
ary rule not applied when a statute was subsequently declared unconstitutionally vague);
United States v. Caceres, 440 U.S. 741 (1979) (rule not applied to evidence obtained in vi-
olation of electronic eavesdropping regulations); Rakes v. Illinois, 439 U.S. 128 (1978)
(fourth amendment rights cannot be asserted vicariously); United States v. Ceccolini, 435
U.S. 268 (1978) (exclusionary rule invoked with greater reluctance where fruit of the ille-
gality leads to a live witness); Stone v. Powell, 428 U.S. at 465 (rule not applicable to
habeas corpus proceedings); United States v. Janis, 428 U.S. at 433 (rule not applicable to
civil proceedings for the collection of taxes); Harris v. New York, 401 U.S. 222 (1971) (il-
legally obtained evidence could be used to impeach defendant's credibility).
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ically, it matters little whether reasonable, good-faith police ac-
tions be viewed simply as beyond the reach of the rule or as con-
stituting an exception to its application. Since numerous writers
and judges have employed the latter formulation, we shall do so
here."57
The New York Court of Appeals took a somewhat different
analytical approach in People v. Adams.58 The police officers in
Adams mistakenly believed they had a third party's consent to
search the defendant's apartment. Rather than relying on an "ex-
ception" to the exclusionary rule, the court stated that a reason-
able, yet mistaken, good-faith belief that a search is legal does
not violate the fourth amendment prohibition against "unreason-
able" seizures.59 In denying the defendant's motion to suppress,
however, the court did not rest its holding entirely on this anal-
ysis, implying that even if the search was unreasonable, the de-
terrence purposes of the exclusionary rule would not be served by
excluding the evidence.60
In Richmond v. Commonwealth,6' the Kentucky Court of
Appeals relied primarily on Williams and Adams in affirming the
denial of the defendant's motion to suppress. In Richmond, po-
lice officers had searched the defendant's vehicle after obtaining
a search warrant from a magistrate in a nearby county and found
a packet of cocaine. The defendant claimed that the fruits of the
search should be suppressed because the magistrate, being in a
different county, did not have the proper authority to issue the
57 622F.2d at 840.
58 439 N.Y.S.2d 877 (1981).
59 Id. at 880-81.
60 Id. at 881. The court stated:
We would agree that where the searching officers rely in good faith on
the apparent capability of an individual to consent to a search and the cir-
cumstances reasonably indicate that that individual does, in fact, have the
authoity to consent, evidence obtained as the result of such a search should
not be suppressed. Application of the exclusionary rule in such instances of
reasonable, good faith reliance by the police would do little in terms of de-
terring misconduct by the authorities in furtherance of the protections af-
forded by the Fourth Amendment.
Id.
61 28 KLS 10, at 17 (Aug. 12, 1981).
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warrant.62
The court of appeals found the defendant's argument unper-
suasive, stating:
We are convinced that the facts of this case do not warrant
the application of the exclusionary rule. There is no question
here but that the officers acted reasonably and in good faith.
There likewise is no suggestion that the magistrate-who issued
the warrant acted in bad faith. We simply hold here, limited
to the facts of the case, that the application of the exclusionary
rule, even if the search warrant was illegal, would do nothing
to deter future police conduct taken in the reasonable and good
faith belief that the conduct was legal. Since there would be no
deterrent effect, there is no reason for the application of the
rule.03
Thus, the court based its analysis on the failure-to-deter theory,
believing that a reasonable, good faith mistake calls for an excep-
tion to the exclusionary rule.
II. CAN THE GOOD FAITH EXCEPTION
WITHSTAND CRITICISM?
A. The Exception's Impact on Judicial Integrity
The good faith exception has been criticized on a number of
grounds, including its impact on judicial integrity. The criticism
62 The opinion of the court of appeals left unanswered the question of whether a
magistrate has the authority to act outside his or her territorial limits. If courts always
failed to address the underlying question of the legality of the officer's conduct, law en-
forcement personnel would be without adequate guidance as to how to make a constitu-
tional search and seizure. Thus, a police officer faced with a similar situation as that found
in Richmond would not know whether a search warrant signed by a magistrate in another
county would be valid to make the search. This situation would raise an interesting ques-
tion: Would the officer in the second case be acting reasonably and in good faith when
m aking such a search if there is no authoritative word from the state's courts?
On appeal, the Kentucky Supreme Court dealt with this issue extensively, holding
that magistrates have statewide jurisdiction to issue search warrants under Kentucky's
Constitution. 29 KLS 10, at 18. The Court stated: "fi]t is clear from Const. See. 109 that
there is but one District Court for the entire state. Hence all of its judges are members of
the same court." Id. The Court further held that the affidavit submitted to the magistrate
contained sufficient information to show probable cause.
'3 Id. at 18.
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is that a "taint" is placed upon the judiciary whenever the excep-
tion provides a protective cloak to illegal police conduct. 4 Justice
Brennan, perhaps the harshest critic of the erosion of the exclu-
sionary rule, wrote in his dissent to the non-application of the ex-
clusionary rule in United States v. Peltier:
If a majority of my colleagues are determined to discard
the exclusionary rule in Fourth Amendment cases, they should
forthrightly do so, and be done with it. This business of slow
strangulation of the rule... would be indefensible in any cir-
cumstances. But to attempt covertly the erosion of an impor-
tant principle over 61 years in the making ... clearly de-
means the adjudicatory function, and the institutional integ-
rity of this Court.6
It may be more forcefully argued, however, that denying the
criminal justice system of valid evidence because of a good faith
error on the part of law enforcement officers creates even greater
doubts as to the ability of the nation's courts to reach a correct
determination in a criminal proceeding.6
Judicial integrity considerations are incorporated into the
balancing approach that is inherent in the good faith exception to
the exclusionary rule.61 It has been stated that if police officers
could not have been deterred because they were acting in the
good faith belief their actions were constitutional, judicial integ-
rity is unscathed by admitting the probative evidence.68 Further,
when the violation is reasonable and made in good faith, use of
the evidence assures the public that the courts are not arbitrarily
excluding highly probative evidence. On the other hand, when
the fourth amendment violation is "flagrant" or "willful" or the
64 E.g., Interpretation, supra note 6, at 84; Comment, Judicial Integrity and Judi-
cial Review: An Argument for Expanding the Scope of the Exclusionary Rule, 20
U.C.L.A. L. REv. 1129 (1973).
65 422 U.S. at 561-62 (Brennan, J., dissenting).
6 Wilkey, supra note 4, at 223. On the other hand, respect for the nation's court sys-
tems maybe tarnished when questionable evidence is admitted on the basis of "dangerous-
ly expanded notions of what is a legal search in order to admit evidence which judges are
reluctant to suppress." Schlesinger, supra note 25, at 405.
67 Michigan v. Tucker, 417 U.S. at 450 n.25.
68 See Stone v. Powell, 428 U.S. at 485-86 n.23; United States v. Peltier, 422 U.S. at
537; United States v. Ajlouny, 629 F.2d 830,840-41 (2d Cir. 1980); United States v. Reda,
563 F.2d 510,511-12 (2d Cir. 1977) (per curiam), cert. denied, 435 U.S. 973 (1978).
(Vol. 70
THE EXCLUSIONARY RULE REVISITED
officer "should have known" he was acting illegally, judicial in-
tegrity is protected only if the evidence is excluded.
B. Considerations of Judicial Policy
In his dissent in Peltier, Justice Brennan also argued that the
seriousness of a fourth amendment violation should not be the
basis for determining whether to exclude the improperly seized
evidence, because the Constitution itself draws that line.,, Bren-
nan believes that courts should focus solely on whether there has
been a constitutional violation; any inquiry into the officer's state
of mind is unjustified. 70 Proponents of the good faith doctrine
find this argument unconvincing, seeing it as a mere "emotional
attachment" to the exclusionary rule.71 They say the constitution
fails to set out the proper remedy for a fourth amendment viola-
tion. 72 In sum, the constitutional argument is viewed as a mere
statement of "preferred judicial policy,"73 with the huge costs in-
flicted upon society by a strict application of the exclusionary
rule requiring the introduction of comparative values into a sup-
pression hearing. 74
C. Practical Difficulties of the Good Faith Doctrine
In response to claims by proponents of the good faith doc-
trine that this new approach to fourth amendment issues shifts
judicial inquiry back to a determination of the guilt or innocence
69 422 U.S. at 551 (Brennan, J., dissenting).
70 Id. at 552-53. Brennan argued: "[The test whether evidence should be suppressed
in federal court has always been solely whether the Fourth Amendment prohibition
against 'unreasonable' searches and seizures was violated, nothing more and nothing less."
Id. at 553 n.11. Accord, Michigan v. DeFillippo, 443 U.S. at 43 (Brennan, J., dissenting)
("The ultimate issue is whether the State gathered evidence ... through unconstitutional
means.").
71 Wilkey, supra note 4, at 217.
7 2 Interpretation, supra note 6, at 68. The author of this article argues that although
individuals are guaranteed the right to be free from unreasonable searches and seizures,
the fourth amendment is not explicit as to what the consequences of a violation should be.
73 Ball, supra note 51, at 655.
74 Wilkey, supra note 4, at 228. See also United States v. Calandra, 414 U.S. at 355-
56 n.11. The American Law Institute's MODEL CODE OF PRE-ARRAiGNMENT PROCEDURES §
SS 290.2 (Proposed Official Draft, 1975) explicitly sets forth factors to be considered be-
fore evidence will be suppressed.
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of the defendant, critics of the doctrine have argued that, as a
practical matter, the exception presents additional problems by
adding yet another fact-finding operation to already overbur-
dened trial courts. 75 This problem is compounded, the critics as-
sert, because of the untrustworthiness of lower courts in giving a
motion to suppress thoughtful consideration. 76 Although such
criticisms concerning the manageability and practical conse-
quences of the good faith exception are difficult to analyze due to
the exception's relatively recent development and limited adop-
tion, the critics' fears and allegations are unsubstantiated. While
some increased burdens are likely, the pessimistic predictions of
these critics cannot be borne out until trial courts have had suffi-
cient opportunity to test the doctrine. 77
In fact, an examination of cases which have already applied
the good faith doctrine reveals that courts have not abused their
discretion in meeting the interpretation problems that inevitably
arise with the adoption of a new legal standard. These courts
75 Interpretation, supra note 6, at 84 n.112; Kaplan, supra note 6, at 1045.
The majority in United States v. Peltier responded to criticisms that lower courts
would be so overburdened by a good faith doctrine that they would automatically deny a
suppression motion as follows:
Whether today's decision will reduce the responsibilities of district courts, as
the dissent first suggests, or whether that burden will be increased, as the
dissent also suggests, it surely will not fulfill both of these contradictory
prophecies. A fact not open to doubt is that the district courts are presently
required, in hearing motions to suppress evidence, to spend substantial time
addressing issues that do not go to a criminal defendant's guilt or innocence.
422 U.S. at 543 n.13.
76 Interpretation, supra note 6, at 84 n.112; Kaplan, supra note 6, at 1045.
'7 The good faith doctrine has been expressly considered in a number of state and
federal courts with varying degrees of acceptance. See, e.g., United States v. Alvarez-Por-
ras, 643 F.2d 54 (2d Cir. 1981) (good faith effort to comply with warrant requirements
will not result in suppression); United States v. Hill, 500 F.2d 315 (5th Cir. 1974) (techni-
cal error will not result in suppression); United States v. Nelson, 511 F. Supp. 77 (W.D.
Tex. 1981) (good faith doctrine is inapplicable when police officers were acting unreason-
ably); United States v. Santucci, 509 F. Supp. 177 (N.D. Ill. 1981) (good faith of officials
in complying with illegal procedures is insufficient to deny motion to suppress); United
States v. Wyler, 502 F. Supp. 969 (S.D.N.Y. 1980) (good faith one factor to be used in
considering a motion to suppress); United States v. Wynn, 11 M.J. 536 (ACMR 1981) (de-
clining to apply good faith doctrine absent explicit Supreme Court approval); Burke v.
Sonoma County, 113 Cal. Rptr. 801 (1974) (rule inapplicable when poice officer is acting
in good faith and reasonably); People v. Pierce, 411 N.E.2d 295 (111. App. Ct. 1980) (bad
faith of police lacking, therefore motion denied).
THE EXCLUSIONARY RULE REVISITED
have emphasized that the good faith of the law enforcement offi-
cer must be objectively reasonable.78 A purely subjective stan-
dard of good faith could create serious questions of abuse, 79 of
course, but the doctrine is not as vague and misleading as its op-
ponents assertA0 A number of guidelines have been developed to
determine what constitutes objective good faith, and limits on
the operation of the rule have been established.
First, an officer may be charged with constructive knowl-
edge that his or her conduct was illegal,"' and no amount of sub-
jective good faith could override that knowledge.8 2 Although it
has been argued that this principle of constructive knowledge is
inconsistent with the good faith doctrine since one without
78 United States v. Peltier, 422 U.S. at 542. In United States v. Williams, 622 F.2d at
844, the court also applied an objective standard. Accord, Richmond v. Commonwealth,
28 KLS 10, at 18; People v. Adams, 437 N.Y.S.2d at 881.
79 Note, Exclusionary Rule: Good Faith Exception-The Fifth Circuit's Approach in
United States v. Williams, 15 GA. L. REv. 487, 502 (1981); Note, Constitutional Law:
Search and Seizure- The Role of Good Faith in Substantive Fourth Amendment Doc-
trine-Michigan v. DeFillippo, 443 U.S. 31 (1979), 55 WASH. L. REV. 849, 850 (1980);
Comment, Fourth Amendment in the Balance-The Exclusionary Rule After Stone v.
Powell, 28 BAYLOR L. REv. 611,627 (1976).
80 See, e.g., United States v. Alvarez-Porras, 643 F.2d at 54. The Second Circuit
Court of Appeals held:
[WI]e reach this decision [not to exclude] without embracing or rejecting the
terms, "inevitable discovery" and "good faith," as exceptions to the exclu-
sionary rule. In this complicated area, it is wiser to let the cases speak for
themselves and to encourage careful analysis and argument than to endorse
vague headings which add little to our understanding of the problems and
which, because of this symbolic impact, may lead inadvertently to a weak-
ening of the Fourth Amendments protection.
Id. at 60. Similar conclusions were reached in United States v. Williams, 622 F.2d at 850
(Rubin, J., concurring specially); United States v. Ajlouny, 629 F.2d at 830; United States
v. Dien, 609 F.2d 1038,1046 (2d Cir. 1979).
The necessary guidance, however, can be found in court opinions and the Amer-
ican Law Institute's MODEL CODE OF PRE-ARRAICNMENT PROCEDURES § SS 290.2 (Pro-
posed Official Draft 1975). Supreme Court Justice Powell expressed approval of the
A.L.I. proposal in Stone v. Powell, 428 U.S. at 490-91 n.29.
81 United States v. Dien, 609 F.2d at 1038.
82 In granting the defendants' motion to suppress in United States v. Santucci, 509 F.
Supp. at 177, the court was harshly critical of the government's failure to go through the
grand jury to obtain the defendants' fingerprints and handwriting samples. The court
would not consider the government's claim of subjective good faith. "[Tihe government
will not be permitted to lift itself by its own bootstraps by establishing impermissible pro-
cedures and then arguing it has followed these procedures in 'good faith."' Id. at 183 n.8.
Accord, United States v. Nelson, 411 F. Supp. at 77.
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knowledge of the illegality of his or her conduct cannot be de-
terred,11 an examination of the underlying deterrence principles
of the exclusionary rule reveals that this argument fails to recog-
nize that the exclusionary rule serves as a general deterrent to il-
legal conduct rather than as a form of punishment of the officer
in any particular case. 4 Thus, it is not inconsistent to charge an
individual police officer with knowledge of the illegality of his or
her actions even if that individual could not have been deterred.
Second, the context in which the illegal search occurs is an
important limiting factor. Police officers are not infallible, and
requiring objectively reasonable conduct will not impose an im-
possible standard of conduct on them in urgent field operations A5
When, however, the illegality occurs in a relatively tension-free
environment, a more stringent standard of conduct should be im-
posed.8 6
Third, the burden of proof is on the government to prove the
objective good faith.87 Thus, in a borderline situation, a trial
court would be required to sustain the motion to suppress, there-
by encouraging law enforcement personnel and the agencies that
train them to acquaint themselves with, and give proper respect
to, constitutional requirements.
83 Comment, supra note 79, at 628.
84 "The exclusionary rule is aimed at affecting the wider audience of all law enforce-
ment officials and society at large." United States v. Peltier, 422 U.S. at 556-57 (Brennan,
J., dissenting). Accord, Oaks, supra note 6, at 710.
85 The Supreme Court has placed particular emphasis on the needs of a police officer
acting in the field. In Michigan v. Tucker, 417 U.S. at 446, the Court stated: "Before we
penalize police error... we must consider whether the sanction serves a valid and useful
purpose."Id.
A stronger criticism of the exclusionary rule's impact on field officers came in
United States v. Soyka, 394 F.2d 443 (2d Cir. 1968). "To me it degrades the Fourth
Amendment when as judges we condemn him [the officer] for making an arrest that, as he
reasonably believed, his duty as a federal officer compelled." Id. at 451 (Friendly, J., dis-
senting).
The Supreme Court of Colorado, which has not explicitly adopted the good faith
doctrine, has on two occasions recognized the practical difficulties of a police officer in de-
termining probable cause in a pressure situation. See People v. Eichelberger, 620 P.2d
1067,1071 n.2 (Colo. 1980); People v. Smith, 620 P.2d 232 (Colo. 1980).
86 See United States v. Santucci, 509 F. Supp. at 179.
87 Brown v. Illinois, 422 U.S. at 604.
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CONCLUSION
The Supreme Court of the United States has expressed a will-
ingness to reconsider the exclusionary rule in terms of the practi-
cal difficulties facing police officers and the costs of its operation
upon society at large. Anticipating that the Court is searching for
a new approach to fourth amendment rights in all contexts,
lower courts have adopted the good faith doctrine. As the court
stated in Williams v. United States:
Where the reason for a rule ceases, the rule should also
cease-a familiar maxim carrying special force here. For here
the cost of applying the rule is one paid in coin minted from the
very core of our factfinding process, the cost of holding trials at
which the truth is deliberately and knowingly suppressed and
witnesses, in contravention of their oaths, are forbidden to tell
the whole truth and censored if they do. This is a high price in-
deed and one that ought never be paid where, in reason, no de-
terrence is called for and none can in fact be had. Such a con-
tinued wooden application of the rule beyond its proper ambit
to situations that its purposes cannot serve bids fair to destroy
the rule entirely in the long run .88
It is not claimed that this exception is an infallible touchstone
which perfectly accommodates the competing interests of the in-
dividual and society at large. That is not to say, however, that
good faith cannot be a useful analytical device in deciding whe-
ther to suppress improperly obtained evidence. Confidence must
be placed in the courts which apply the rule. 9 Protection of
fourth amendment rights is the utmost consideration in such a
determination. But when the exclusion of evidence fails to meet
such a laudable purpose, courts should have more than a "single-
bed blanket" with which to reach a just and equitable result. The
questionable effectiveness of the exclusionary rule should not be
used to justify an inflexible approach to the protection of fourth
amendment rights.
Holly Martin Stone
88 622 F.2dat847.
89 Brown v. Illinois, 422 U.S. at 612. "[I]n view of the inevitably fact-specific nature
of the inquiry, we must place primary reliance on the 'learning, good sense, fairness and
courage of judges who must make the determination in the first instance." Id. (citing Nar-
done v. United States, 308 U.S. 338,342 (1939)).
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